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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This matter is before this Court under Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
pursuant to a notice of appeal filed by the appellants in the Third District Court on 
February 8, 2000. This appeal stems from the final order and judgment of the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson denying the appellants' motion for summary judgment and granting 
appellee's motion for summary judgment. (Record 93-97). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
In addition to issue number 1 presented by appellants, whether the Utah PIP 
statutes Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-306, et. seq., mandate payment of household services 
and lost income benefits to a decedent's estate, appellee presents as an additional issue 
on appeal whether the appellants' claim that the insurance contract is ambiguous, in order 
to extend the scope of coverage, was properly presented to the trial court thereby 
allowing consideration by this Court. 
STANDARD OF APPELLANT REVIEW FOR ISSUE NOT RAISED 
IN THE TRIAL COURT 
In order for a substantive issue to be preserved for appeal, it must have been raised 
before the trial court. West One Bank Utah v. Life Ins. Co., 887 P.2d 880, 882, Note 1 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). This Court's standard requires more than a mere mention of such 
an issue in the pleadings and requires a party to present evidence of ambiguity to the trial 
court in order to develop a record sufficient to present an appeal. See: Hart v. Salt Lake 
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County Com % 945 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1997). Appellants' brief is devoid of any 
citation to the record or pleadings showing this issue was presented to the court below. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY REFERENCES 
This appeal is based on the no-fault, personal injury protection benefits found in 
Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-22-306, et seq. Set forth below are the pertinent statutory 
provisions, pursuant to Rule 24 (a)(b) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-306, provides: 
Personal injury protection. 
Personal injury protection under Subsection 31A-22-302(2) provides the 
coverages and benefits described under Section 31A-22-307 to persons 
described under Section 31A-22-308, but is subject to the limitations, 
exclusions, and conditions set forth in Section 31A-22-309. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 (1)(1994), provides: 
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits 
include: 
(a) The reasonable value of all expenses for 
necessary medical, surgical...not to 
exceed a total of $3,000 per person; 
(b)(i) The lesser of $250.00 per week or 85% 
of any loss of gross income and loss of 
earning capacity per person from 
inability to work, for a maximum of 52 
consecutive weeks after the loss, except 
that this benefit need not be paid for the 
first three days of disability,... 
(ii) A special damage allowance not 
exceeding $20.00 per day for a 
3 
maximum of 365 days, for services 
actually rendered or expenses reasonably 
incurred for services that, but for the 
injury, the injured person would have 
performed for his household... 
(c) Funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed $1,500 
person; and 
(d) Compensation on account of death of a person, payable to 
his heirs, in the total of $3,000. 
Utah Code Ann, § 31A-22-308(1990), states: 
Persons covered by personal injury protection. 
The following may receive benefits under personal injury 
protection coverage: 
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident 
involving any motor vehicle, regardless of whether the 
accident occurs in this state, the United States, its 
territories or possessions, or Canada, except where the 
injury is the result of the use or operation of the named 
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under 
the policy; 
(2) persons related to the insured by blood, marriage, 
adoption, or guardianship who are residents of the 
insured's household, including those who usually 
make their home in the same household but 
temporarily live elsewhere under the circumstances 
described in Section (1), except where the person is 
injured as a result of the use or operation of his own 
motor vehicle not insured under the policy; and 
(3) any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an 
automobile accident occurring while the person 
occupies a motor vehicle described in the policy with 
the express or implied consent of the named insured or 
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while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident 
occurring in Utah involving the described motor 
vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from a suit for declaratory judgment filed by appellee, Regal 
Insurance Company, against the appellants. Appellants' son was a passenger in a vehicle 
owned and operated by an acquaintance, Jason L. Allen. Mr. Allen lost control of his 
vehicle on November 7, 1998 and the vehicle rolled and killed Jesse Bott instantly. 
Appellee, under its policy of insurance issued to Mr. Allen and his vehicle, paid over to 
the appellants $1,500.00 for the funeral/burial benefits and $3,000 representing the death 
benefit. It subsequently paid to the appellants $25,000 representing the bodily injury 
liability limits available under the policy. 
Appellants sought additional personal injury protection benefits as a result of 
Jesse Bott's death, comprising $20.00 per day for 365 days, representing the special 
damages allowance for household services, and $250.00 per week for 52 weeks, 
representing loss of income benefits. Appellee then filed the declaratory judgment action 
and upon cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court denied the appellants' 
claims and granted appellee's motion that the appellants were not entitled to these 
additional benefits and entered judgment accordingly. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following facts are gleaned from the record and the addendum to this brief. 
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1. Appellee's policy of insurance at issue here was issued to Jason Allen and 
covered the vehicle he was driving on November 7, 1998. (Record 56-58). 
2. Jesse Bott was a passenger in that vehicle. (Id.) 
3. Jesse Bott was unmarried at the time and resided with his parents, the 
appellants. (Id.) 
4. The Allen vehicle was involved in a one-car rollover and Jesse Bott died 
instantly from the injuries he received in that accident. (Id. 56-58). 
5. Appellee paid to appellants on December 4,1998, $1,500.00 representing 
the funeral/burial benefits and on December 7, 1998, $3,000, representing the death 
benefits under the policy, and subsequently on February 8,1999, $25,000, representing 
the bodily injury limits. (Id, 56-58). 
6. Appellants also demanded lost household services of $20.00 per day for 
365 days and $250.00 per week for 52 weeks for loss of income. (Record 33-38). 
7. Appellee initiated the declaratory judgment action on August 5,1999, 
which included a copy of the policy in question. (Record 1-26). 
8. The policy provided personal injury protection coverage on pages 4-7 
(Record 8-11) of the policy, to wit: 
1. PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE 
We will pay personal injury protection benefits to or on 
behalf of each eligible injured person for: 
A. medical expenses, 
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H. work loss, 
I. funeral expenses, and 
J. survivor loss. 
9. Under the definitions contained within that section, the policy defined 
certain critical terms: 
A. Bodily injury means bodily injury, sickness, or 
disease, including death resulting therefrom; 
B. Eligible injured person means: 
(1) the named insured or any 
relative who sustains bodily 
injury caused by an accident 
involving the use of any motor 
vehicle; 
(2) any other person who 
sustains bodily injury caused by 
an accident while: 
(a) occupying the insured motor 
vehicle with the consent of the 
insured, or 
(b) a pedestrian if the accident 
occurs in Utah and involves the 
use of the insured motor vehicle. 
M. Work loss means: 
1 loss of income and loss of earning 
capacity by the eligible injured person 
during his lifetime, from inability to 
work during a period commencing three 
days after the date of the loss of gross 
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income and loss of earning capacity and 
continuing for a maximum of 52 
consecutive weeks thereafter, provided 
that if such eligible injured person's 
inability to work shall so continue for in 
excess of a total of two consecutive 
weeks after the date of the loss of gross 
income and loss of earning capacity, this 
three day elimination period shall not be 
applicable; and 
2 an allowance for services actually 
rendered or expenses reasonably 
incurred that, but for the bodily injury, 
the eligible injured person would have 
performed during his lifetime for his 
household, commencing three days after 
the date of the bodily injury and 
continuing for a maximum of 365 
consecutive days thereafter; provided 
that if such eligible injured person's 
inability to perform such services shall 
continue for in excess of two 
consecutive weeks after the date of the 
bodily injury, this three day elimination 
period shall not be applicable. 
10. The appellants are acting individually and for the estate of Jesse 
Bott, pursuant to the Order of January 4, 2000. (Record 88-89). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The no-fault act is designed to provide a non-judicial method of temporary 
compensation for individuals disabled in an automobile accident. In the case of a 
resulting death, the legislature provided a funeral/burial benefit of $1,500 and a death 
benefit of $3,000 payable to the heirs. Death and disability are not synonymous and a no-
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fault claimant who dies instantly in an automobile accident does not empower his heirs or 
estate to collect the disability benefits of lost income and lost household services. 
Extending such coverage violates the intent of the act in providing temporary 
compensation to injured individuals during their period of recuperation. 
The legislature understood the difference between "disability" and "death," when 
it enacted the no-fault legislation and intentionally omitted "estates," in total, and "heirs," 
except for the death benefit, as recipients entitled to no-fault benefits. Lost household 
services and lost income are reserved to those surviving and recuperating from injuries 
sustained in an automobile accident. 
The policy language in question provides no broader coverage and the appellants 
never raised the issue of the policy's ambiguity in the court below. Therefore, they have 
waived any claim to bring that issue before this court on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MANDATORY COVERAGE DOES NOT EQUAL MANDATORY PAYMENT; 
AND, THE NO-FAULT ACT MUST BE CONSTRUED ACCORDING TO THE 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND ITS ENACTMENT. 
This Court has examined claims for personal injury protection benefits before and 
it did not do so in isolation of the legislature's intent in enacting the no-fault act. In 
Versluis v. Guaranty Nat Co., 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992), the plaintiff was involved in 
an automobile accident and sought disability benefits for work loss compensation, even 
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though she demonstrated no work history. This Court examined the legislative history 
behind the no-fault statutes, stating: 
When construing a statute, we must give effect to legislative 
intent, West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 
1982). To that end, we presume that the Legislature used 
each term advisedly, and we give effect to each term 
according to this ordinary and accepted meaning. Id. For 
assistance in ascertaining the meaning of statutory language, 
we look to the background and general purpose of the statute. 
Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 559 P.2d 958, 959 
(Utah 1977). 
The No-fault Automobile Insurance Act was enacted "[t]o 
effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of handling the 
greater bulk of the personal injury claims that arise out of 
automobile accidents." Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-2 (1974). 
PIP benefits are intended to provide immediate compensation 
for out-of-pocket expenses and actual * loss of earnings 
occurred as a result of an accident without having to bring a 
lawsuit. See Jamison, 559 P.2d at 959. Unlike an award of 
damages based on negligence, PIP disability benefits are paid 
monthly so that claimants can continue to meet basic living 
expenses. Utah CodeAnn.§ 31A-22-309(5). PIP benefits 
were not intended "to provide an automatic reward or a 
'windfall,' for being involved in an accident by requiring 
payment when there was no loss actually suffered..." 
Jamison, 559 P.2d at 960. Although Jamison dealt with PIP 
benefits for loss of household services, the basic policy 
referred to there applies equally to disability benefits. 
Id. at 867. (Emphasis added). 
This Court then rejected the plaintiffs contention that she was entitled to the no-
fault benefits "merely by showing a loss of earning capacity and nothing more (as) not 
consistent with either the statutory language or the policy of the act." Id. 
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Similarly, appellants' claims here must be analyzed under the light cast by the no-
fault statutes. Respondent concedes that Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-306 (1986), requires 
automobile insurance policies to make available personal injury protection coverages to 
those persons described in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-308 (1990). However, the fact that 
a policy provides those coverages does not mean automatic payment as the appellants 
seek here. In fact, the appellants do not even fall within the class of persons covered by 
personal injury protection. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-308 (1990), defines those classes 
of persons to whom personal injury protection benefits must be extended, to wit: 
Persons covered by personal injury protection. 
The following may receive benefits under personal injury 
protection coverage: 
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident 
involving any motor vehicle, regardless of whether the 
accident occurs in this state, the United States, its 
territories or possessions, or Canada, except where the 
injury is the result of the use or operation of the named 
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under 
the policy; 
(2) persons related to the insured by blood, marriage, 
adoption, or guardianship who are residents of the 
insured's household, including those who usually 
make their home in the same household but 
temporarily live elsewhere under the circumstances 
described in Section (1), except where the person is 
injured as a result of the use or operation of his own 
motor vehicle not insured under the policy; and 
(3) any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an 
automobile accident occurring while the person 
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occupies a motor vehicle described in the policy with 
the express or implied consent of the named insured or 
while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident 
occurring in Utah involving the described motor 
vehicle. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Keeping in mind that Jesse Bott was a passenger in the Allen vehicle for which 
this policy was issued, Jesse Bott was only entitled to coverage under subsection (3) as a 
person occupying a motor vehicle with the permission of the named insured. His estate 
and parents are not "persons covered by personal injury protection" under the statute. 
This approach is not novel. In Gregory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 618 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 
App. 1981), the Kentucky court wrestled with the same issues as brought to this court. In 
that case, the estate of the decedent who was killed instantly in an automobile accident 
sought "work loss" benefits. The Kentucky court, after examining its state's personal 
injury protection statutes, held that the estate of the decedent was not a "person" entitled 
to those benefits and that those benefits were reserved to living human beings while 
absent from work. Id. at 588-89. See also: Flannigan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 383 Mass. 
195, 417 N.E.2d 1216 (1981), wherein the Massachusetts court rejected a suit by the 
heirs for the lost wages of the decedent, holding that the personal injury protection 
statutes provided reimbursement for lost wages to living individuals, not to heirs or 
estates. 
Examining Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(1994), provides further evidence of the 
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legislature's intent. That statute provides: 
(1) Personal injury protection coveiages and benefits 
include: 
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, 
surgical, x-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic 
devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to 
exceed a total of $3,000 per person; 
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week of 85% of any loss of 
gross income and maximum of 52 consecutive weeks 
after the loss, except that this benefit need not be paid 
for the first three days of disability, unless the 
disability continues for longer than two consecutive 
weeks after the date of injury; and 
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day 
for a maximum of 365 days, for services actually 
rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for services 
that, but for the injury, the injured person would 
have performed for his household, except that this 
benefit need not be paid for the first three days after 
the date of injury unless the person's inability to 
perform these services continues for more than two 
consecutive weeks; 
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of 
$1,500 per person; and 
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his 
heirs, in the total of $3,000. 
(Emphasis added). The legislature never used the term "estate" as a beneficiary entitled 
to any benefits at all. It extended benefits to the person in subsections (a), (b), (c) and to 
the heirs only under (d). The legislature never extended to heirs or estates work loss or 
special damage benefits. 
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This conclusion is further buttressed by the legislature's scheme relating to the 
payment of benefits. In the case of a death, the funeral benefit and death benefit are 
immediately payable in lump sums. In the case of an injured PIP recipient, the benefits 
for lost household services and lost income are payable monthly, "as expenses are 
incurred;' Utah Code Ann, § 31 A-22-309(5)(a)(1994). It makes no sense to provide 
monthly payments for lost household services and lost income in the case of death. 
In the instant case, the death of Jesse Bott provided his heirs exactly one benefit, 
as found under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(l)(d), "compensation on account of death 
of a person, payable to his heirs, in the total of $3,000." Additionally, Jesse Bott under 
subsection (c) was entitled to funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total 
of $1,500 per person. Both of these benefits have been paid under this policy, and the 
appellants are entitled to no more. 
POINT II 
DEATH AND DISABILITY ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS AND THE NO-FAULT ACT 
DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR LOST HOUSEHOLD SERVICES AND WORK LOSS 
FROM AN INSTANTANEOUS DEATH IN AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT. 
As this court recognized in Versluis, supra at 867, PIP benefits are intended to 
provide immediate compensation for out-of-pocket expenses and loss of earnings 
without a lawsuit. Moreover, this court recognized that PIP disability benefits "are paid 
monthly so that claimants can continue to meet basic living expenses." This court also 
presumes that the legislature used each term in a statute advisedly and "gives effect to 
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each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Id., quoting West Jordan v. 
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). 
In describing the class of PIP benefits that the legislature mandated that 
automobile insurance policies cover under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(1994), the 
legislature used very specific language. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(l) subsection (b) 
(i)-loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity-extends compensation only to 
persons suffering a "disability" from "inability to work" for fifty-two consecutive weeks. 
When the legislature requires that household services be paid, it defined those services as 
ones the "injured person would have performed for the household." The legislature 
steered away from including in these two categories "death" and it did so in the face of 
judicial holdings by this court distinguishing "disability" from "death." 
In Jones v. Trans America Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), the claimant 
sought lost wages and lost household services, as the appellants seek here. This Court 
refused to extend those benefits in Jones, holding that: 
The benefits contemplated by the Act are phrased in terms of 
"disability" not in terms of "physical impairment." The 
former is generally understood to mean the inability to work, 
whereas the latter refers to the loss of bodily 
function...Likewise, if not disabled for purposes of loss of 
earnings benefits, neither is he disabled for purposes of 
household services benefits. Indeed, the act was never 
intended to give an injured plaintiff a windfall or extra 
income as a benefit of having had an accident. 
(Id at 61 l-12)(Citations omitted). 
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Further, this Court in Marriott v. Pacific Nat. Assur. Co., 24 Ut.2d 182,467 P.2d 
981 (1970), examined a claim by the administrator of an estate seeking to recover 
benefits under a group insurance program. The decedent was killed on the job and the 
insurance company denied benefits because the death occurred before the eligibility date 
had been reached. The policy contained a provision that an employee who had become 
"disabled" while on the job, could continue to accrue time towards the eligibility date 
even though that employee could not work or pay for any of the insurance benefits. The 
administrator of the estate argued that the fact that the decedent was killed in the accident 
before the eligibility date meant that the decedent was "disabled" and, therefore, his 
estate was entitled to coverage upon the eligibility date being reached had he survived. 
Id. at 982. This Court rejected this approach as being a hyper-technical extension of the 
plain language of the contract. Id. at 983. This Court held that the term "disabled" is quite 
different from death and that no coverage was available to the estate. Id. 
Appellants' approach here has already been rejected by other courts. In Hamrich 
v. State Farm Mut Auto Ins. Co., 270 So. C. 176, 241 S.E.2d 548 (1978), the 
administrator of the estate tried the same approach under a similar statutory scheme. In 
that case, the administrator of the decedent's estate sought the lost income PIP benefits 
when her husband was killed in an automobile/pedestrian accident. Her approach was 
that death was the ultimate disability. The South Carolina court rejected her approach 
when examining its no-fault statutes and determined that no-fault benefits were to assist 
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injured persons while recuperating because those statute used the term "disability" 
regarding lost income benefits. The court went on to hold that disability meant the 
inability of a living person to work. Id. at 550. The disability terminated at recovery from 
the injury or death. Id. at 550. 
Therefore, in the face of legislative history and judicial precedent, the no-fault 
statutes clearly distinguish benefits which are extended to insureds who suffer 
"disability" versus those who suffer "death." A person falling within the no-fault 
coverages provided does not obtain both disability and death benefits, as argued by the 
appellants here. Jesse Bott died instantly in the automobile accident and was entitled to 
funeral benefits and his "heirs" were entitled to the death benefit. Those benefits have 
been paid and work loss benefits and household services benefits are not available under 
the facts of this case. In fact, to extend work loss benefits and household services in the 
face of an instantaneous death, would violate the very purpose of the act. As this Court 
has recognized, the purpose of the no-fault act is to assist those persons who are disabled 
as a result of an automobile accident to recoup out-of-pocket expenses and receive 
income during the period of their disability to meet basic living expenses until the person 
returns to work. Those benefits are paid on a monthly basis. It makes no sense to pay 
those benefits on a monthly basis for a death. To accept the appellant's position here, 
would nullify the plain language of the statute and emasculate its purpose in being 
enacted in its present form. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANTS' CLAIM THAT THE POLICY IS AMBIGUOUS, HAVING BEEN 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, IS NOT PRESERVED FOR 
CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT AND THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO 
ADDRESS IT. 
The claim of ambiguity is raised for the first time in appellants' brief, precluding 
this court from considering that issue. This is not novel law. In Hart v. Salt Lake County 
Com 'n, 945 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1997), the county appealed an adverse jury verdict in 
an automobile accident case, claiming it owed no duty to the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
challenged the county's appeal of that issue, arguing that the county had failed to 
preserve the issue for appeal since it had not raised that issue before the trial court. Our 
court of appeals agreed and declined to address that issue, holding: 
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first 
raise the issue before the trial court. See West One Bank, 
Utah v. Life Ins. Co., 887 P.2d 880, 882, n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). '"A matter is sufficiently raised if it is submitted to the 
trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on 
the issue." State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (citations omitted). For a court to be "afforded an 
opportunity to rule on the issue," several requirements must 
be met. First, the issue must be raised in a timely fashion. 
This court has explained: 
"To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a 
party must timely bring the issue to the attention 
of the trial court, thus providing the court an 
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. 'Issues 
not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are 
deemed waived, precluding [the appellate 
court] from considering their merits on 
appeal.9" 
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Online Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 n. 1 (Utah 
Ct. Axo. 1993) (citations omitted). Second, the issue must be 
specifically raised, see State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 
(Utah 1989), such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a 
"level of consciousness" before the trial court, James v. 
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Third, the 
party must introduce to the trial court "supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority" to support its argument. Tolman v. 
Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 461 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) (citations omitted); see also West One Bank, 887 
P.2d at 882 n. 1 (" The mere mention of an issue in the 
pleadings...is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus 
insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.'" (quoting 
LeBaron & Assocs., Inc. v. Rebel Enters. Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 
482-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1991))). 
(Id) at 129-30. 
In the case at bar, the pleadings are devoid of any mention or claim by the 
appellants that the policy provisions in question are ambiguous. In fact, under paragraph 
2 of their answer and counter claim, they state: "that the contract speaks for itself." 
(Record 33). A review of appellants' motion for summary judgment and supporting 
memorandum (Record 59-69) demonstrates that the terms "ambiguous" or "ambiguity" 
or their derivatives were not used, let alone presented as a basis of argument. The 
transcript of oral argument (Record R 98; full text attached as addendum) demonstrates 
again that these terms were never mentioned, nor was the issue of ambiguity focused 
upon for consideration by the trial court. 
The appellants have not preserved this issue for consideration by this court. It was 
not timely raised nor specifically raised in the court below. Further, appellants presented 
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no evidence of ambiguity or relevant legal authority in support of their argument. 
Additio a 
hint that ambiguity is an issue to be decided in this case. Therefore, this court should 
decline to address the issue of ambiguity. Hart, supra at 131 
POIN 
ASSUMING APPELLANTS HAVE PRESERVED AMBIGuil Y ut THE 
INSURANCE CONTRACT ON APPEAL, REGAL'S POLICY IS NOT AMBIGUOI IS 
IT IS NOT BROADER THAN THE STATUTES, THE APPELLANTS DO NOT 
QUALIFY AS AN "ELIGIBLE INJURED PERSON," AND WORK LOSS AND 
HOUSEHOLD SERVICES ARE RESTRICTED TO LIVING INDIVIDUALS. 
A. APPELLAh r — NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE POLIC TC 
AMBIGUOUS 
In Nielsen v. O 'Reilfy, 848 P.2d 664, 665-66 (Utah 1Q9? 
long- standing law regarding the interpretation of insurance contracts: 
,, Generally, the interpretation of insurance policy language 
presents a question of law to be decided by the trial judge 
using accepted methods of construction. Specifically, the 
terms of insurance contracts, as well as all contracts, are t be 
interpreted in accordance with their usually accepted 
meanings and should be read as a whole, in an attempt to 
harmonize and give effect to all of the contract 
provisions...Policy language is ambiguous if it is not "plain to 
a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing 
the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual 
and natural meaning of the words, and in the light of existing 
circumstances, including the purpose of the policy. 
(Citations omitted). 
This court has not deviated from its earlier pronouncements that: 
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When a question arises regarding a written document, the 
first source of inquiry must be the document itself, considered 
in its entirety. 
Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). 
The rules of these cases mandate against the appellants' construction of the policy 
in this case. This Court does not recognize strained or hyper-technical extensions of 
policy language in order to derive some sort of ambiguity, as urged by appellants in their 
brief. Turning to the policy language, and looking at the entire policy, the definitions in 
ordinary and plain terms, describe these persons entitled coverage. 
The personal injury protection coverages are set forth within the policy under 
PART B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE, found at pages 4 
through 7 (R 8-11) of the policy attached to the complaint on file. Persons entitled to PIP 
coverages are defined as "eligible injured persons." The policy provides the definition of 
that term at (R 9) as follows: 
B. "Eligible injured person" means: 
(1) the named insured or any relative who sustains 
bodily injury caused by an accident involving the use 
of any motor vehicle; 
(2) any other person who sustains bodily injury caused by an accident 
while: 
(a) occupying the insured motor 
vehicle with the consent of the 
insured, or 
(b) a pedestrian if the accident 
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occurs in Utah and involves the 
use of the insured motor vehicle. 
Under this definition, the appellants are not eligible injured persons and they are 
not entitled to PIP benefits, other than those set forth under section 5(d) (p. 6 of the 
policy, 1. Il 111 which provides a maximum amount payable for survivor loss of $3,001).00 
B. WORK LOSS AND HOUSEHOLD SERVICES ARE PAYABLE ONLY 
FOR THE TIME DURING WHICH THE INJURED PERSON LIVES; THEY DO NOT 
SURVIVE THE DEATH OF THE INJURED PERSON. 
The policy defines the term "work loss" at pages 5-6 (R 9-10), as follows: 
loss of income and loss of earning capacity by 
the eligible injured person during his lifetime, 
from inability to work during a period 
commencing three days after the date of the loss 
of gross income and loss of earning capacity 
and continuing for a maximum of 52 
consecutive weeks thereafter, provided that if 
such eligible injured person's inability to 
work shall so continue for in excess of a total of 
two consecutive weeks after the date of the loss 
of gross income and loss of earning capacity, 
this three day elimination period shall not be 
applicable; and 
(2) an allowance for services actually rendered or 
expenses reasonably incurred that, but for the bodily 
injury, the eligible injured person would have 
performed during his lifetime for his household, 
commencing three days after the date of the bodily 
injury and continuing for a maximum of 365 
consecutive days thereafter; provided that if such 
eligible injured person's inability to perform such 
services shall continue for an excess of two 
consecutive weeks after the date of the bodily injury, 
this three day elimination period shall not be 
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applicable. 
(Emphasis added). 
Under these definitions, the benefits are provided while the injured person~not a 
decedent-is disabled as a result of the accident. 
It is axiomatic that language in an insurance policy is given its plain and ordinary 
meaning. The term "lifetime" is not equivalent to "life span". Taking the simplest 
approach and simply going to the dictionaries, such as Houghton, Mifflin, New College 
Edition The American Heritage Dictionary the English Language (American Heritage 
Pub. Co., Inc. and Houghton, Mifflin Company 1975), at page 755, the definition of the 
term "lifetime" is given as follows: 
n. 1 The period of time during which an individual is alive. 2 
The interval or amount of time during which an object, 
property, process or phenomenon exists or functions, -adj 
continuing or lasting for such a period of time: A lifetime 
guarantee. 
This is a different concept from "life span"--defined as: 
The period of time during which an organism remains alive 
under normal or optimum conditions. 
(14). 
In Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Merriam-Webster Inc. 1983), at 
page 690, the following definition of the term "lifetime" is given: 
H.(1 3c) 1: The duration of the existence of a living being or a 
thing 2: The duration of the existence of an ion or subatomic 
particle 3: An amount accumulated or experienced in a 
lifetime... 
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Black \ I iiw I UctioNun I West I'nli " n |w% I ill i (Inn mil pi i ink ,i ili'linifiun 
of lifeti1 • • ) M it iloes LMVC .I legal definition of the te oil "life " as 
follows: 
That state of animals, humans, and plants or of an organized 
being, in which its natural functions and motions are 
performed, or in which its organs are capable of performing 
their functions. The interval between birth and death. The 
sum of the forces by which death is resisted... 
Therefore, under the ordinary usage of the term lifetime, it is clear that work loss 
is available only while the insured is unable to perform work and is living. 
Appellants claim that because the policy defines "bodily injury" to mean "bodily 
injury, sickness. or disease, including death resulting therefrom" (policy page 5, R at 9), 
that broader coverage is afforded. Their position has been considered by other courts and 
has been rejected. In Perez v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 613 P.2d 32 (Ore. 1980), 
the Oregon Supreme Court reviewed a policy which provided work-loss benefits in the 
contr- automobile/pedestrian fatality. Neither flu pohn iinm Htm ,ill,!ink1 driinnl flu 
terms "injured person" or "disability." The court recognized that the word "disability" 
ordinarily did not describe death, although death "is undeniably the ultimate disability." 
(id. i held that the term involves the inability of a person to perform 
activities due to physical incapacity or weakness,, but in I <lr;ilh 1 lie re ill! I I ml>, lllii.il 
approach in reviewing the statutory no-fault language that the work-loss benefits had not 
been intended by the legislature to be extended in cases of death. 
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In the case of Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 613 P.2d 36 (Ore. 1980), the court 
held that the term "disability" found within the statute meant the inability, while living, to 
perform one's usual activities. The court held that death was not disability and there 
could be no loss of income benefits due under the policy, even though the policy 
included the term death within its definition of "bodily injury." In that case, the Oregon 
Supreme Court found that even though the policy included death within its definition of 
"bodily injury," as the Regal policy does here, it did not create an ambiguity. Rather, it 
clarified the provision that the company would pay funeral expenses "incurred with 
respect to bodily injury." (Id. at 38). The court looked to several other jurisdictions which 
had reached the same conclusion, in issuing its holding. 
In the case at bar, it is the appellants' position that strains the ordinary language of 
the insurance contract in an attempt to create an ambiguity to escape the terms of the 
policy and the legislature's intent. This court should reject this strained approach and 
affirm the trial court and hold that the policy does not create any ambiguities. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF 
Appellants are entitled to no further benefits under the statutory provisions or the 
policy language in question, since they have been fully compensated. Appellants are not 
"persons" under either the policy or the statutes who are entitled to personal injury 
protection benefits beyond the funeral/burial benefits and death benefits that they have 
already received from appellee. In the case of almost instantaneous death, as has occurred 
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here the heirs and/or estate of the deceased occupant of a motor vehicle are not entitled 
to reien r linniisdiiiild * n\ IN i iiml 1  »( iiiiin inin* hniciils I hnsi Iknefih lire res* n nl In 
injured persons "disabled" by an automobile accident in order to assist them during the 
recuperation period, and which benefits are paid monthly during the disability period. 
Once the disability ends and they return to work, whether it is several weeks or several 
months llii" benefits termina 
extended to living persons. To extend these benefits to decedents violates the statutory 
purposes behind the no-fault act. Additionally, appellants cannot claim that the policy is 
ambiguous since they did not preserve that issue in the court below by raising it in either 
their pleadr HI I .muni)1 lh.il llns i nurt 
wishes to reach that issue, the policy language is not ambiguous. Therefore, this court 
should affirm the order and judgment of the trial court. 
ADDENDUM 
A „ — - n 
as Exhibit "A"; the full text of the trial court's order regarding the motions 
summary judgment as Exhibit "B"; the judgement entered by the trial court as Exhibit 
a full copy of the transcript of oral argument as Exhibit "D"; a fully copy of page 
7SS nl Ihiu^ii/iii i l l ' i i ' i ' i in ,'YII iir i 'i »//<•#(' IUIUKMI iln imencan Heritage Dictionary the 
English Language (American Heritage Pub. Co., Inc. and Houghton, Mif" 
1975) as Exhibit "E"; a fully copy of page 690, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
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Dictionary (Merriam-Webster Inc. 1983) as Exhibit "F"; and a fully copy of page 923, 
Black's Law Dictionary (West Pub. Co. 1996 Ed.) as Exhibit "G". 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _X7_ day of September,/000 
sakalos 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the c^M day of September, 2000, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were deposited in the U.S. Mail, first-
class postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Steven B. Smith 
Darwin H. Bingham 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES .• i A-_ . ^v 
(6) No rating surcharge may be applied to any policy of motor \«-hic!</ 
nsurance issued in this state as a result of payment of a claim made under t h 
lection. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-305.5, enacted 
5y L. 1990, ch. 321, § 1. 
31A-22-306, Personal injury protection, 
Personal injury protection under Subsection 31A-22-302(2) provides the 
coverages and benefits described under Section 31A-22-307 to persons de-
scribed under Section 31A-22-308, but is subject to the limitations, exclusions, 
and conditions set forth in Section 31A-22-309. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-306, enacted by 
L, 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 158. 
-iJ.ATER.AI , KK:VKKNVKS 
A.L.R. — Combining or "stacking" of "no ages in automobile liability policy or policies, 29 
fault" or personal injury protection (PIP) cover- A.L.R.4th 12. 
31A-22-307. Personal inji coverages and 
benefits. 
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include: 
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, 
X-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance, 
hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person; 
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income and 
loss of earning capacity per person from inability to work, for a 
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss, except that this 
benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless the 
disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the 
date of injury; and 
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a 
maximum of 365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses 
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the injured 
person would have performed for his household, except that this 
benefit need not be paid for the first three days after the date of injury 
unless the person's inability to perform these services continues for 
more than two consecutive weeks; 
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to ex.c< - • :,; ->f $1,500 
per person; and 
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable :. J I I I \ 
in the total of $3,000. 
(2) (a) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided 
for in Subsection (1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commis-
sioner shall conduct a relative value study of services and accommodations 
for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or rehabilitation of an injured person in 
the most populous county in the state to assign a unit value and determine 
the 75th percentile charge for each type of service and accommodation. 
The study shall be updated every other year. In conducting the study, the 
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31A-22-307 INSURANCE CODE 
department may consult or contract with appropriate public and private 
medical and health agencies or other technical experts. The costs and 
expenses incurred in conducting, maintaining, and administering the 
relative value study shall be funded by the tax created under Section 
59-9-105. Upon completion of the study, the department shall prepare and 
publish a relative value study which sets forth the unit value and the 75th 
percentile charge assigned to each type of service and accommodation. 
(b) The reasonable value of any service or accommodation is determined 
by applying the unit value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to the 
service or accommodation under the relative value study. If a service or 
accommodation is not assigned a unit value or the 75th percentile charge 
under the relative value study, the value of the service or accommodation 
shall equal the reasonable cost of the same or similar service or accom-
modation in the most populous county of this state. 
(c) This subsection does not preclude the department from adopting a 
schedule already established or a schedule prepared by persons outside 
the department, if it meets the requirements of this subsection. 
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance any 
patterns of overcharging, excessive treatment, or other improper actions 
by a health provider within 30 days after such insurer has knowledge of 
such pattern. 
(e) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of 
either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than 
three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the issue 
of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical services or expenses. 
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection (l)(a) and in Subsection 
31A-22-309(l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and 
treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of 
healing. 
(4) The insured may waive for the named insured and the named insured's 
spouse only the loss of gross income benefits of Subsection (l)(b)(i) if the 
insured states in writing that: 
(a) within 31 days of applying for coverage, neither the insured nor the 
insured's spouse received any earned income from regular employment; 
and 
(b) for at least 180 days from the date of the writing and during the 
period of insurance, neither the insured nor the insured's spouse will 
receive earned income from regular employment. 
(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance 
providing coverages greater than the minimum coverage required under this 
chapter nor does it require the segregation of those minimum coverages from 
other coverages in the same policy. 
(6) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to the insurance coverages 
required under this section. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by 1989, ch. 261, § 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1991, 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 159; ch. 74, § 7; 1994, ch. 71, § 1. 
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NOTES TO 
ANALYSIS 
wable benefits. 
[ousehold services. 
,oss of earnings. 
itration panel. 
missal of claim. 
le computation. 
t claims. 
Availability of insurance benefits. 
Motorist's liability. 
owable benefits. 
Household s e rv ices . 
The phrase "and regardless of whether any of 
sse expenses are actually incurred" in former 
rsion of this section was included to elimi-
te the necessity of proving such expenses and 
prevent the insurer from claiming the benefit 
services rendered gratuitously by friends or 
latives which otherwise would have to be 
ud for; it did not require that reimbursement 
? made any time a family lost the services of 
le of its members regardless of the character 
* those services. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire 
is. Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977). 
Former provisions did not require insurer to 
ay the family of a twelve-year-old boy injured 
I an automobile accident $12 per day during 
he period of the boy's disablement as reim-
bursement for the value of lost services, which 
i*ould have consisted of doing dishes, carrying 
>ut the garbage, washing the family car, and 
>ther similar chores because it was not reason-
ible to assume that the family would in fact 
lave incurred expenses to perform the boy's 
:hores, and so they were not entitled to reim-
oursement. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. 
Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977). 
If a person is not "disabled" for purposes of 
loss of earnings benefits, neither is he "dis-
abled" for purposes of household services ben-
efits. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 
609 (Utah 1979). 
The legislature intended to establish the 
mandatory household services benefit as an 
aggregate maximum of $20 per day of disabil-
ity, up to a maximum of 365 days of disability, 
and not as an individual maximum of $20 on 
each day services are actually rendered. Tanner 
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
—Loss of earnings . 
"Disability" refers to the inability to work; 
injured party who was able to work during the 
period for which disability benefits were sought 
and who earned more than $150 per week 
during the entire time for which benefits were 
sought was not entitled to disability benefits for 
loss of earnings. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 
DECISIONS 
592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979). 
A claimant who was unemployed at the time 
of his or her accident can collect disability 
benefits for lost wages from prospective em-
ployment only if the claimant establishes that a 
job was available for which the claimant was 
qualified and that the claimant would have 
taken that job. The legislature did not intend to 
provide compensation for "loss of earning ca-
pacity" unless a claimant has suffered a direct 
and specific monetary loss. Versluis v. Guar-
anty Nat'l Cos., 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992). 
Arbitration panel. 
Failure to arbitrate a claim before a panel 
was not grounds for dismissal of plaintiff's 
complaint. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Dismissal of claim. 
This statute provides no basis on which to 
dismiss a claim. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct, App 
1993). 
Time c o m p u t a t i o n . 
The 52 consecutive week period in Subsection 
(l)(b)(i) runs from the loss of gross income and 
loss of earning capacity, not from the date of the 
accident. Plaintiff who did not begin to suffer 
loss of income and loss of earning capacity until 
six months after an accident and continued to 
suffer that loss for a period exceeding the 
maximum benefit of 52 weeks was improperly 
denied coverage when the trial court only pro-
vided for coverage for 52 weeks following the 
date of the accident. Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
857 P.2d 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Tort claims. 
—Availability of i n s u r a n c e benefi ts . 
No-fault benefits are available to those who 
sustain serious injury even though they remain 
free to pursue a tort claim as well; however, the 
injured person is not entitled to a double recov-
ery from the tort-feasor and under no-fault for a 
single loss. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 
P.2d 609 (Utah 1979). 
Where insured brought action against his 
no-fault insurer seeking additional no-fault 
benefits after receiving benefits from the no-
fault insurer and obtaining a judgment against 
a third-party tort-feasor, insured was collater-
ally estopped from recovering additional no-
fault benefits in the form of lost wages but was 
not collaterally estopped from recovering for 
household expenses. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. 
Co., 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981). 
—Motorist's liability. 
A party having the security required under 
31A-22-308 INSURANCE CODE 
this section is granted partial tort immunity and economic losses not compensated by the 
and is not personally liable for the benefits benefits paid hereunder, if the threshold provi-
provided hereunder; he remains liable for cus- sions of § 31A-22-309 are met. Allstate Ins. Co 
tomary tort claims, such as general damages v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 113. providers from the practice of waiving patients' 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of "no- obligation to pay health insurance deductibles 
fault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d or copayments, or advertising such practice 8 
229. A.L.R.5th 855. 
Validity of state statute prohibiting health 
31A-22-308. Persons covered by personal injury protec-
tion. 
The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection cover-
age: 
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any motor 
vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state, the United 
States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except where the injury is 
the result of the use or operation of the named insured's own motor vehicle 
not actually insured under the policy; 
(2) persons related to the insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or 
guardianship who are residents of the insured's household, including 
those who usually make their home in the same household but tempo-
rarily live elsewhere under the circumstances described in Section (1), 
except where the person is injured as a result of the use or operation of his 
own motor vehicle not insured under the policy; and 
(3) any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an automobile 
accident occurring while the person occupies a motor vehicle described in 
the policy with the express or implied consent of the named insured or 
while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident occurring in Utah 
involving the described motor vehicle. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-308, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1990, ch. 327, § 9. 
ANALYSIS 
Limitation of policy covering driver. 
Motorcycle driven by insured. 
Out-of-state incidents. 
Limitation of policy covering driver. 
Passenger in an automobile driven by in-
ured's son but owned by another person was 
ot entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) 
overage under a policy covering the driver. 
McCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Motorcycle driven by insured. 
The coverage described in § 31A-22-307 was 
applicable to an insured killed while riding a 
motorcycle involved in an accident in this state 
with a motor vehicle; there is no requirement 
that the insured must be operating or occupy-
ing the motor vehicle to be subject to coverage, 
but only that he be in an accident involving a 
motor vehicle. Coates v. American Economy 
Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981). 
Out-of-state incidents. 
In light of language limiting application of 
former provisions to accidents in this state, 
insurance commissioner's regulation making 
no-fault insurance coverage applicable to inci-
dents occurring outside the state was in error. 
IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 R2d 296 
(Utah 1975), overruled on other grounds, Neel 
v. State, 889 R2d 922 (Utah 1995). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
^X.R. — What constitutes "entering" or surance policy, or statute mandating insurance 
ighting from" vehicle within meaning of in- coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149. 
1A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions lo 
personal injury protection. 
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a 
Dlicy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of 
:tion for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been 
aused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one 
r more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objec 
tive findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(2) (a) An}T insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage uruir' this 
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured 
or a resident family member of the insured and not insured under the 
policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the 
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the 
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his 
injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of 
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition 
incident to any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, 
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials. 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which 
may be contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are 
reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a 
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation 
or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because that person is on 
active duty in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, 
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by 
the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
;.MY 
31A-22-309 INSURANCE CODE 
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be 
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. 
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 
days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of 
expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as 
to the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue 
if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any 
part or all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by 
reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof 
is received by the insurer. 
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses 
shall bear interest at the rate of 1 Vi% per month after the due date. 
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract 
to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is 
required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the 
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to 
the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another 
insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of 
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other 
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by 1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160; § 8; 1992, ch. 230, § 9; 1994, ch. 4, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Acceptance of monthly payment. 
—Effect on insurer's obligation. 
Accrual of cause of action. 
Attorney's fees. 
—Appeal. 
Claims against federal government. 
Household exclusion clause. 
Personal injury protection requirements. 
Pleadings. 
Reimbursement. 
—Recovery from insured and his insurer. 
Release given by injured party to tort-feasor. 
Tort claims. 
—Liability of insured. 
—Pleading and instructions. 
Workers' compensation. 
Constitutionality. 
The no-fault statute satisfies the open courts 
provision of Utah Const., Art. I, § 11, because it 
not only provides a tort victim with a reason-
able and alternative remedy, but also elimi-
nates a clear social or economic evil; further, it 
does not violate the uniform operation of laws 
provision of Const., Art. I, § 24, because it 
makes a reasonable classification between seri-
ous and less serious injuries. Warren v. 
Melville, 937 P.2d 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Acceptance of monthly payment. 
—Effect on insurer's obligation. 
The acceptance of a monthly payment by an 
insured from a no-fault insurer does not termi-
nate the contractual obligation of the insurer to 
make additional payments for subsequently 
accrued claims. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 
635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981). 
Accrual of cause of action. 
A cause of action against the state accrues at 
the time of the subject accident rather than 
when the plaintiff satisfies the threshhold re-
quirements under this section. Jepson v. State, 
846 P.2d 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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Attorney's fees. 
—Appeal. 
Plaintiff was not required to file a cross-
appeal in order to be entitled to attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal in defending his judgment 
for benefits. Coates v. American Economy Ins. 
Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981). 
Claims against federal government . 
Even if the federal government could be char-
acterized as an insurer because it provided 
financial security for its employees in regard to 
vehicle operation claims, it could not be sub-
jected to mandatory arbitration under Subsec-
tion (6), since this would conflict with the 
administrative arrangement established in the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co. v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 651 (D. 
Utah 1989). 
Household exclus ion clause. 
A household or family exclusion clause in an 
automobile insurance policy is contrary to pub-
lic policy and to the statutory requirements 
found in the No-Fault Insurance Act as to the 
minimum benefits provided by statute. Farm-
ers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). 
If an insurer fails to disclose material exclu-
sions in an automobile insurance policy and the 
purchaser is not informed of them in writing, 
those exclusions are invalid. Without disclo-
sure, the household exclusion clause fails to 
honor the reasonable expectations of the pur-
chaser, rendering the exclusion clause invalid 
as to the entire policy limits. Farmers Ins. 
Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). 
Household or family exclusions are valid in 
this state as to insurance provided by an auto-
mobile policy in excess of the statutorily man-
dated amounts and benefits. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1987). 
Personal injury p r o t e c t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s . 
In order to invoke the provisions of Subsec-
tion (6), the individual wTho initially pays the 
amounts for which personal injury protection 
benefits are also available must be "another 
insurer." McCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
Subsection (6) does not contemplate arbitra-
tion between an uninsured victim's father and 
another's insurance company. McCaffery v. 
Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Pleadings. 
Summary judgment and dismissal of plain-
tiff's complaint with prejudice was proper, 
where the complaint and plaintiff's deposition 
tailed to allege any permanent disability or 
impairment based on objective findings, and, 
further, defendant was not required to support 
his motion for summary judgment with affida-
vits showing there was no permanent disabil-
ity. McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). 
Reimbursement . 
—Recovery from insured and his insurer. 
Where passenger collected personal injury 
protection benefits from driver's insurer and 
received an additional settlement in an action 
against the driver of the other car, the insurer 
had no right of subrogation to the recovery of 
the passenger, but could claim reimbursement 
from the other driver's insurer in an arbitration 
proceeding. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 
1197 (Utah 1980). 
Release given by i n ju red p a r t } to tort-
feasor. 
Injured party who entered into a settlement 
agreement with his tort-feasor, whereby he 
released the tort-feasor from any and all known 
and unknown personal injury as well as prop-
erty damage arising from the auto accident, cut 
off his insurance company's subrogation rights, 
and by so doing was not entitled to further 
benefits from his insurance company under the 
no-fault coverage. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. 
Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), but see Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
Insurer's obligation to continue to pay per-
sonal injury protection (PIP) benefits was not 
extinguished by a settlement and release be-
tween its insured and the tortfeasor because 
there was no evidence that the parties under-
stood or intended that the settlement include 
PIP benefits, and the release did not extinguish 
the insurer's right under this section to seek 
reimbursement for further PIP payments from 
the torfeasor's insurer through binding arbitra-
tion. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 937 P.2d 
1282 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Tor t c laims. 
—Liabil ity of i n s u r e d . 
If a party has the security required under 
§ 31A-22-307, he is granted partial tort immu-
nity and is not personally liable for the benefits 
provided under § 31A-22-307, but he remains 
liable for customary tort claims of general dam-
ages and economic losses not compensated un-
der § 31A-22-307. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 
P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
— P leading and instruct ions . 
When injured party is entitled under thresh-
old provisions of this section to maintain claim 
for personal injuries not compensated by per-
sonal injury protection benefits, the injured 
party should plead only for those damages for 
which he has not received reparation under his 
first party insurance benefits; to present a 
completely factual picture to the jury, the in-
jured party may wish to present evidence of all 
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his medical bills or other economic losses; in 
such a case, the court, by appropriate instruc-
tion, could explain to the jury that those eco-
nomic losses have not been included in the 
prayer for damages because the injured party 
has previously received reparation under his 
own no-fault insurance. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 
606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
Workers' compensation. 
A no-fault insurer is permitted by Subsection 
(3)(a) to exclude from coverage provided under 
its insurance policy any liability for injuries 
that are compensable under the workers' com-
pensation statute or a similar statutory7 plan. 
This provision, however, is irrelevant in a pro-
ceeding before the Industrial Commission in-
volving only the employee and an employer who 
has carried no-fault insurance but not workers' 
compensation insurance. Bevans v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
A state employee who was injured in a car 
accident in the course of her employment was 
entitled to collect personal injury protection 
(PIP) benefits under this section, to the extent 
those benefits were not covered by workers' 
compensation. The workers' compensation ex-
clusivity provision, § 35-1-60 (now § 34A-2-
105), does not bar such action; the provision of 
the state's self-insurance program excluding 
PIP benefits to any person entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits is not in harmony with 
statutory requirements, and is therefore in-
valid. Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. —Allstate Insurance Co. 
v. Ivie: Reimbursement Between Insurers Un-
der Utah's No-Fault Act, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 379. 
Attorney's Fees in Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 
553. 
Note, The Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress: A New Cause of Action in Utah, 1989 
Utah L. Rev. 571. 
AX.R. — Validity and construction of "no-
fault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d 
229. 
Injury or death caused by assault as within 
coverage of no-fault motor vehicle insurance, 44 
A.L.R.4th 1010. 
Who is "employed or engaged in the automo-
bile business" within exclusionary clause of 
liability policy, 55 A.L.R.4th 261. 
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting 
from" vehicle within meaning of insurance 
policy, or statute mandating insurance cover-
age, 59 A.L.R.4th 149. 
Validity and construction of automobile in-
surance provision or statute automatically ter-
minating coverage when insured obtains an-
other policy providing similar coverage, 61 
A.L.R.4th 1130. 
Right of employer or workers' compensation 
carrier to lien against, or reimbursement out of, 
uninsured or underinsured motorist proceeds 
payable to employee injured by third party, 33 
A.L.R.5th 587. 
31A-22-310. Assigned risk plan. 
(1) After consultation with insurers authorized to issue policies containing 
the provisions specified under Section 31A-22-302, the insurance commis-
sioner shall approve a reasonable plan for the equitable apportionment among 
the insurers of applicants for those policies who are in good faith entitled to, 
but are unable to procure, these policies through ordinary methods. 
(2) Upon the commissioner's approval of a plan under this section, all 
insurers issuing policies described under Section 31A-22-302 shall subscribe to 
and participate in the commissioner's approved plan. 
(3) Any applicant for a policy under the commissioner's plan, any person 
insured under the plan, and any insurer affected by the commissioner's plan 
may appeal to the insurance commissioner from any ruling or decision of the 
manager or committee designated to operate the plan. 
(4) Section 31A-2-306 applies to the commissioner's decision on this appeal. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-310, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 161, § 82. 
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I \ ' : ' : ' " i ?^ . j ! .ii, \\\ DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
REGAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a division of WINDSOR GROUP. 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAURIE BOTT and EVAN B< ) l"i 
Defendants. 
ORDER RE: CROSS MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990903734 
Judae Timothv R. Hanson 
Tin " "in Miiiiiii' l'ili<i-il' ,,i' I •• ,-il ,ii"iniuM i ii December 20, 1999 on the 
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, and the court having reviewed the memoranda 
submitted by the parties, received oral argument !>>, mun-d and ukcu n'u .n.iiiu under 
advisement ilii umi l miw mles as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The court finds the following facts to be tine: 
1. The defendants Laurie and Evan Bott. are heirs of the decedent. Jesse E. Bott. 
2. The defendants also properly represent the estate of Jesse Bott and the heirs of Jesse 
Bott. 
3. Jesse Bott died instantly as a result of an automobile accident of November 7, 1998. 
4. Plaintiff paid to the heirs under its policy the personal injury protection benefits of 
$3,000 for the death benefit and $1,500 for the funeral benefits. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The court further rules: 
1. The named defendants properly represent themselves, the estate of Jesse Bott and 
the heirs of Jesse Bott. 
2. The heirs and estate of Jesse Bott are not "persons" under the policy or under the 
no-fault provisions of Utah legislation, i.e., Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-306, 307 and 308 (1990). 
3. Jesse Bott's "death" is not a "disability" under the policy or the Utah No-Fault 
Statutes. 
4. Work loss and household services are payable to insured persons incapacitated by 
automobile accidents and are not payable to decedents, their heirs or their estates. 
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court 
orders that the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted, the defendants' motion for 
2 
summary judgment is denied, the defendants' counter-claim is dismissed and the plaintiffs prayer 
for declaratory judgments granted. 
DATED this^^dav of - X U ^ . 2000. 
/ > 
Honorable Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ljj_ day o f J / l m ^ - w 2000, I mailed, via First Class Mail, 
postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of the foregoing^ORDER RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following: 
Steven B. Smith 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Second Floor 
261 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TabC 
T.J. Tsakalos (3289) 
Of Counsel 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1708 
Fax:(801)359-9004 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REGAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ; 
a division of WINDSOR GROUP. 
INC., ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
LAURIE BOTT and EVAN BOTT ; 
Defendants. ) 
) JUDGMENT 
I Civil No. 990903734 
1 Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
The court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismisses their counter-
claim and grants the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and grants the plaintiff declarator}' 
judgment as follows: 
1. No work-loss benefits are due to the defendants, the estate of Jesse Bott, or to his 
heirs under the Regal policy described in the complaint. 
Third Judicial Di; .iCt 
JAN 2 7 :::: 
< - .SALT LAKE C" wf^TY 
By__2 ^ . — 
Dc^iiiy Clerk 
2. No household services benefits are due to the defendants, the estate of Jesse Bott 
or his heirs under the Regal policy described in the complaint. 
3. The defendants' counter claim is dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Each party will bear its own costs and fees. 
SO ORDERED this ^ 'day of
 {_\c^^ 2000. 
^ Honorable Judge Timothy R Hanson 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the \Q_ day of\J# k^dl^OOO. I mailed, via First Class Mail, 
postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to the following: 
Steven B. Smith 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Second Floor 
261 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
REGAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAURIE BOTT, et al., 
Defendants, 
Case No. 990903734 
CROSS MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
(Videotape Proceedings1 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 20th day of 
December, 1999, commencing at the hour of 10:04 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
T.J. TSAKALOS 
Attorney at Law 
Kipp & Christian 
10 Exchange Place, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
STEVEN B. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
Scalley & Reading 
261 East 300 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
©@PY 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: The record will show 
we're in session in the Regal Insurance versus Laurie 
Bott and others, 990903734, on the Court's calendar for 
the plaintiff's motion for summary judg—well, actually, 
it's cross motions for summary judgment. Pardon me. 
Appearances, please, Counsel? 
MR. TSAKALOS: T.J. Tsakalos for 
plaintiff, Regal Insurance, a division of the Windsor (?) 
Group, your Honor. 
MR. SMITH: Steven B. Smith for the 
defendants and counter-plaintiffs. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
I think the plaintiff's motion was first in 
time, was it not? 
MR. SMITH: It was. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Tsakalos, 
would you like to start, please? 
MR. TSAKALOS: Yes, your Honor. For-
-in order to shorten things down, I think we have filed 
cross motions for summary judgment and I'll try to 
address as many of the arguments as I can now the first 
time around and save very little for rebuttal. 
Both parties have submitted pretty extensive 
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briefs on the issue. I think it's relatively clear what 
the issues are and where the cases are going on it. 
Basically, your Honor, just by background, 
Jessie Bott was a single individual that died instantly 
in an automobile accident in which he was a passenger. 
My company paid the funeral benefits, the burial benefits 
and then we reached a settlement with his parents. 
I want to get directly to the claims of—that 
they are entitled to additional no-fault benefits, 
specifically lost income and the household services. I 
think we have to take a look at the act and note that the 
purpose of the no-fault act was to provide a no-fault 
mechanism for compensation for individuals while they're 
recuperating. 
And in this particular case—and—and the 
purpose of that no-fault act, I should say, is to try to 
get these people on their feet, kind of keep them whole 
while they're recuperating and hopefully, the objective 
is to avoid bringing a tort claim into the system. 
Now, in this particular case, I think it's 
important to note that we're dealing with a specific kind 
of policy that seems to have some sort of hybrid 
characteristics, but I want to make clear the 
distinctions that I think the plaintiffs—or the 
claimants are focusing on and I want up front that the 
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act is not a life insurance policy that gives a benefit 
to the estate or heirs. 
It—and that appears to be the approach here, 
that it is both a disability policy and a life policy 
that automatically provides benefits and I don't think 
that was the intent of the legislature from the statutes, 
and it's certainly not the intent of the policy which 
follows the statute. 
Jessie Bott's parents and—and after I have 
reviewed the statutes, are not even persons entitled to 
benefits. They don't fall within the omnibus clause, 
that says—the statute that says, here's who gets 
benefits. They are not injured persons under the policy. 
The only time that they are compensated under the no-
fault act is when there is a direct—when there is a 
death and they are the heirs. 
And in this particular case, under both the 
statute and under the policy, they got that death benefit 
and they also got the funeral benefit. 
There seems to be a big approach by the 
claimants in this particular case that somehow death and 
disability are the same, and they are not, and our Utah 
Court has so recognized. 
It—it—just to take it in a—in a simple view, 
I may have life insurance and I may have a disability 
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policy. Upon my death, my family collects under the life 
insurance, but they don't get disability payments until 
my natural life or under the life tables I would have 
died in the normal course of events. They get one or the 
other. If I'm disabled, I get disability benefits. I 
don't get life insurance. 
In this particular case, the claimants want 
both. They're claiming they get disability benefits, 
which is for lost household services and the—and the 
lost income, plus they get the—the death benefits that 
were provided under the statute and under the policy. 
Additionally, I think it's important for the 
Court to note that household services are provided under 
our no-fault statute to the injured person to help them 
keep their home and their estate so—not the estate in 
terms of the wron—of the death, but in terms of their 
household, in terms of getting lawns mowed or getting 
dishes taken care of or cooking, while they're 
recuperating. 
In this particular case, Jessie lived at home 
with his parents. It—it is not Jessie's house—it is 
Jessie's household, if any, that could have made the 
claim, not Jessie's parents that could have made the 
claim. And more importantly, we need to keep in mind 
that Jessie was a passenger in a vehicle in which he died 
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from the accident that is not even under his own policy 
that they are attempting to make this double collection, 
as I view it. 
Finally, as I've stated in my briefs, 
particularly the Kentucky case, the parents and the 
estate, Jessie's estate, are not persons within the 
statute. That's already been decided by the Kentucky 
court and household services and lost wages are, like I 
said, are to provide to recuperating persons to try to 
make—keep them whole, until they're back, functioning in 
a normal sort of way and avoid the tort system. 
Finally, in the rebuttal that I was putting 
together, your Honor, I did stumble across Marriott vs. 
Pacific Life Insurance, the Utah case from 1970, 
involving an employee where they were trying to claim 
disability benefits and death benefits at the same time. 
And our court was very clear in saying, you cannot equate 
death with disability and even though tha.t definition is 
included within the policy, as I've pointed out, in both 
the Oregon court cases that I cited to the Court, it 
simply does not get you from—it helps define bodily 
injury for when personal injury benefits kick in, but it 
doesn't say you get household services, lost income, 
death benefits, all at the same time for one event which 
resulted in an instantaneous death. 
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And that's basically our approach and I tried 
to take for the Court and for the claimants, your Honor, 
just go to the definitions from the dictionary and I 
think there's a hang-up in their behalf that life span 
and lifetime are the same thing and they're not 
Life span, as I've pointed out in my briefs are 
the time that you exist—that is the language the policy 
uses. When your life ends, those benefits end, other 
than you may get—your estate may get the death benefits 
or the funeral benefits. 
And I think it's an unfortunate accident, but 
he died instantly and he's not entitled—they are not 
entitled, under either definition or by statute or by the 
policy to receive household services and lost income on 
an instantaneous death and that's basically our approach. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: To begin with, your 
Honor, I think it's important to—to look at, in the 
beginning, the purpose of the insurance code set out in 
31-A-1-102, that is to—I have copies for the Court. 
Under 102(2), it's to insure the policy holders, 
claimants and insurers are treated fairly and equitably. 
And then under 201, that the Code should be 
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liberally construed to achieve the purposes stated in 
that section. 
Under Utah law, anyone that issues an 
automobile insurance policy in this State is obligated to 
provide certain coverages. Part of those coverages 
required by law include the personal injury pirotection 
benefits set forth in 31-A-22-307. 
To begin with, we would dispute that the—the— 
on the immediacy of death question. I don't know that 
that's been conclusively established insofar as it may 
make a difference and we'd reserve the right to contest 
that, if it does—if it is an issue. 
Nevertheless, the argument that— 
THE COURT: I don't know. Is it an 
issue or isn't it? 
MR. SMITH: I don't believe that it's 
an issue. I think that we're beyond that. 
THE COURT: Do you believe that he 
went on for days or weeks or months? 
MR. SMITH: No. He didn't, he died 
at the scene and there were no medical expenses other 
than ambulance. 
THE COURT: Well, I think for the 
purposes of these motions, he died immediately. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. But the—the 
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argument that the Botts are not entitled to PIT benefits, 
at no time have the Botts personally made any claim for 
PIT benefits. The Botts7 claim has always been on behalf 
of Jessie Bott, on behalf of their son, they're his only 
heirs and they made the claim on behalf of the estate. 
And— 
THE COURT: But the estate isn't 
suing here, nor has the estate asserted a counterclaim, 
huh? 
MR. SMITH: They—they—I'm going to 
say that there was a misnomer of the parties, if that's 
the case. Regal is the one that brought the— 
THE COURT: Well, you—I don't know, 
you guys form the pleadings, not me. 
MR. SMITH: Regal's the one that 
filed the—filed it, and if you'll look at Regal's 
memorandum even, I'm trying to find it, but they 
recognized the fact that—it may be in a motion—that the 
Botts pursued claims on behalf of the estate of—of 
Jessie Bott. And if that is an issue, we'd make a motion 
to amend the pleadings, amend the counterclaim to be a 
counterclaim by the Estate of Jessie Bott or as a third-
party plaintiff, as an intervenor. That's the way that 
the parties would approach this entire thing and T.J., 
isn't the question whether or not wages and household 
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services are due to somebody who dies in an automobile 
accident, not necessarily who these folks are? 
MR. TSAKAL0S: Well, those are the 
issues, your Honor, and I don't have a problem 
determining today, is it the estate and/or the Botts 
individually. I think the arguments apply, I've 
addressed both in the briefs. We've got cases on 
estates— 
THE COURT: Well, the only thing I 
know is that I don't have any estate in the pleadings in 
this case. 
MR. SMITH: Well, I'm willing to 
clean that up right now, however you want to do it. 
THE COURT: I don't. I'm just here 
to hear it< 
want to do. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. 
THE COURT: It's what the two of you 
MR. TSAKALOS: Do you want to 
proceed? 
MR. SMITH: I—I do want to proceed 
and I want to proceed on behalf of—you know, with the 
Botts pursuing this claim as representatives of the State 
of Jessie Bott. 
THE COURT: Does Jessie Bott have any 
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other heirs? 
MR. SMITH: He does not. 
THE COURT: No siblings? 
MR. SMITH: He has siblings. 
However, the parents, I think are the sole heirs. 
THE COURT: Did he have a will? 
MR. SMITH: He did not. 
THE COURT: Did he have any children? 
MR. SMITH: No. I think one of the 
stipulated facts was that—that Jessie—or excuse me, 
that Laurie and Evan Bott are Jessie Bott's only heirs as 
far as the facts that have been stipulated for this 
motion. 
THE COURT: I guess my only concern 
is, is that if there's no estate established through the 
courts and notice given to other persons, how do we ever-
-how do we not know there's somebody out there who may 
claim an interest in the estate here? 
MR. SMITH: Well, I think the 
parents, as representatives of the estate would have an 
obligation to safeguard and protect anyone else—any of 
the other interested parties' rights under the probate 
code. 
And the stipulated fact, the stip—Paragraph 
No. 6 in the Botts' motion states that Laurie and Evan 
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Bott are the natural parents and only heirs of Jessie 
Bott and the personal representatives of the Estate of 
Jessie Bott, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
75-2-103. I believe that was part of the stipulated 
facts that the parties agreed to when these motions were 
filed. 
THE COURT: Well, I understand that, 
but unless some probate court has made the a first 
representative of the estate, then it appears that there-
-there is no estate, unless these monies come into it. 
MR. SMITH: Well, the money that 
they—well— 
THE COURT: This seems to me you've 
got a procedural problem and a party problem that needs 
to be agreed to. I have no problem if you want to call 
this Laurie and Bott—and Laurie Bott and Evan Bott as— 
on—for and on behalf of the State of Jessie Bott. 
That's fine with me, but— 
MR. SMITH: Is that all right with 
you? 
MR. TSAKALOS: Works for me. 
MR. SMITH: Individually and on the 
estate? 
MR. TSAKALOS: Sure. Let's get.it 
done. 
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THE COURT: All right. You can amend 
the pleadings, submit an order so indicating based on 
stipulation of the parties. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. The argue—the 
argument that we make is that the Estate of Jessie Bott 
is entitled to PIT benefits. 31-A-22-308 discusses the 
categories of individuals who are entitled to the 
protections required by statute and that's where it talks 
about any other natural persons who injuries arise out of 
an automobile accident occurring while the person 
occupies the insured motor vehicle. 
The arguments of Regal would permit them to 
escape any responsibility for the PIT benefits of someone 
dies, under their argument that the estate doesn't 
constitute a person, which we would entirely disagree 
with. 
The Court—it's fairly simple—or it's fairly— 
I mean, it's a fairly straightforward interpretation of 
the statute, the legislative intent needs to be defined 
by the language that is used and the language that is not 
used. 
The PIT benefits that are required by law are 
set forth in Section 307. There are basically four 
categor—or four categories of PIT benefits. Under 
307(1)(a), it's the medical expenses; under 307(b), it's 
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the lost wages and the household services; under 307(c) 
funeral expenses and under 307(1)—or 307(1)(d), it's the 
death compensation. 
The—if the death compensation, funeral 
expenses were not—were supposed to be only paid when 
there was a surviving individual, the legislature easily 
could have put "or" after Subsection (b). They did not. 
Their failure to put "or" was four separate and distinct 
categories and those—that needs to be applied to the 
facts of the accident. 
Under the lost wages, it reads simply that it 
should be paid, the lesser of $250 per week or 85 
percent of any loss of gross income and loss of earning 
capacity per person from inability to work. And then it 
puts a maximum number of days, after—52 consecutive 
weeks after the loss. 
And we—Jessie Bott, I think it is undisputed 
is unable to work, he has an inability to work, he's had 
a loss of gross earning capacity, he was working at the 
time of this accident, he was bringing income in, he was 
helping contribute to the household finances of the 
family. 
Under the next section of (b) is the household 
services and under the statu—the—the benefits have to 
be provided for services actually rendered or expenses 
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reasonably incurred for services that, but for the 
injury, the injured person would have performed for his 
household. 
And in this case, Jessie Bott sustained an 
injury, a life-ending injury which prevented him from 
doing numerous tasks at home. 
THE COURT: Well, do you think 
there's a difference between being injured and being 
killed? 
MR. SMITH: I think someone can die 
without an injury; but I think in this particular case, 
that the death resulted from an injury in the— 
THE COURT: Well, that didn't answer 
my question. The legislature uses: if a person is 
injured, they're entitled to certain benefits. Does the 
legislature have in mind that when they use the word 
"injury", they also meant to say that as a result of a 
person's death, they're entitled to certain benefits? 
MR. SMITH: I think the legislature 
could have done that, but I don't think that—I think 
that in this case, the vast majority of people in—that 
are involved in an automobile accident are going to be 
injured and that's what they're looking at in this case. 
I don't think that excludes someone who's been killed 
from making a recovery—recovery for these same items of-
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-of benefits. 
THE COURT: I know you're saying 
that, but what I—but what I asked is whether or not you 
see a difference between the legislature using the word 
"injury" and not using the word "death". It says a 
person who is injured is entitled to loss of household 
services and loss of income. It doesn't say a person who 
is injured or killed. 
MR. SMITH: And that may be— 
THE COURT: Does that make a 
difference? 
MR. SMITH: I don't think that it 
makes a difference in this case. Not—I think that if 
the death results from an injury, that he falls within 
this category and is entitled to that measure of 
benefits. 
But there's no statutory language cited in 
Kentucky, no definition of disability and the analogy to 
a disability insurance policy is rather misleading as 
well. In every disability insurance policy, there is a 
specific definition of disability that doesn't exist in 
this case and again, I think that when you read the 
entire Section 307 that discusses what types of PIT 
benefits must be provided—and admittedly, the statutory-
-or excuse me, the policy language would not provide 
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benefits if the policy language was not violative of the 
statute, but they cannot limit their coverage any more 
than what's required by the statute. No matter what they 
say in the policy, if it limits it less than what's 
required, that—those policy provisions are stricken. 
THE COURT: Has the—was the policy 
submitted for approval by the insurance commissioner? 
MR. SMITH: I believe it was. I 
don't—I don't know— 
THE COURT: I guess that the 
insurance commissioner at least thought—whatever that's 
worth—that it complied with the statute. 
MR. SMITH: Well, there have been 
other cases in the past where that hasn't been the case. 
THE COURT: Well, I understand that; 
I'm just saying that it has been submitted and apparently 
the insurance commissioner, who is charged with the 
responsibility of seeing that the policies comply with 
state law thought that the policy complied with state 
law. 
MR. SMITH: We—we checked with the 
insurance commissioner's office and they have never 
rendered an opinion or bulletin on this issue. 
THE COURT: But they didn't refuse to 
accept the policy for writing in Utah, did they? 
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MR. SMITH: No, They did not. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SMITH: And we think this is a 
straightforward poli—or statutory—statutory 
interpretation that the separate and distinct categories 
indicated by Sub-parts (a), (b), (c) and (d) are four 
types of PIT benefits that are required to be paid when 
someone is injured or, in this case, killed in an 
automobile accident. And that the Estate of Jessie Bott 
is entitled to those benefits from Regal Insurance. 
THE COURT: Mr. Smith, did you find 
any cases outside Utah that seemed to be with the same 
issue, that said now the estate of a deceased person is 
entitled to these types of no-fault benefits? 
MR. SMITH: I believe they7re out 
there. I—I could probably submit them by the end of the 
day, if the Court would like. 
THE COURT: But you haven't— 
MR. SMITH: I— 
THE COURT: —at least not in your 
brief? 
MR. SMITH: No. No. 
THE COURT: Even though I—I guess 
everybody agrees Utah hasn't spoken on that, but— 
MR. SMITH: It has not and I spoke 
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with several; adjustors and they came down all over the 
board on this. Some said— 
THE COURT: Well, I'm less impressed 
by adjustors than I—than you are by the insurance 
commissioner. 
MR. SMITH: Whatever that's worth. 
THE COURT: Whatever that's worth. I 
don't even know who the insurance commissioner is these 
days. 
Okay. Thank you. Appreciate it. 
Mr. Tsakalos, anything further? 
MR. TSAKALOS: I'm just going to make 
a couple of quick comments, your Honor. The policy—to 
address the question of whether this policy's been 
approved. If you'll note, that was attached to the 
complaint, it's Policy No JAR43C. That's the third 
edition that's been submitted to Utah for approval. It's 
been in effect since 3-1995, so this is a policy approved 
by the insurance commission, if that's a (sic) issue for 
the Court. 
I have cited a number of cases to the Court 
that is addressed, estates, heirs in terms of claiming 
wages and special lost household services. Again, we've 
talked about—counsel raised the issue of which 
categories the statute allows—mandates PIT benefits for. 
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When it talks about wages, it talks about—the 
statute talks about the disabled person, during his 
disability. When it talks about the special damage 
allowance, it again uses the term "injured person". 
Neither of those categories talk about estates, heirs or 
decedents or a policy holder or someone entitled to PIT 
benefits who has died. 
The—the only time you find that term is when 
they talk about the death benefit. The statute refers to 
the death benefit payable to his heirs. 
And if we take the approach that the claimants 
are making today, simply because the statute has set 
forth all of these potential benefits that you may be 
entitled to under no-fault, I guess we could take the 
reverse; had Jessie Bott been injured and goes along for 
six months, 52 weeks and says, golly gee, there's a death 
benefit and a funeral benefit, so I'm going to collect a 
special damage allowance, the lost wages and certainly 
the death and the funeral benefit. 
So, the statute, even the way the scheme that 
the legislature put in the statute, isn't you just 
automatically get all those benefits, you must fall in 
these categories. 
And there appears to be no dispute today that 
the policy provides any greater coverage than the statute 
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and I think the Court has enough to rule that they are 
not entitled to anything beyond the funeral, the death 
benefit and then we've already paid the bodily injury 
that's covered the wrongful death claim in this 
particular case. 
THE COURT: No, that's under a 
separate part of it, nothing to do with this case. 
MR. TSAKALOS: Right. Right. 
THE COURT: That's (inaudible) 
provision. 
MR. TSAKALOS: But that's what the 
tort system was designed to do and this is not the tort 
system, this is the (inaudible) system. 
I think we're ready to submit it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. TSAKALOS: Unless you have 
questions of me. 
THE COURT: I don't think so. 
Do you wish one more comment, you get the last 
statement, you've got a motion. 
MR. SMITH: We don't think that it 
would be fair or equitable to permit an insurance company 
to avoid payment of a wage or a household service benefit 
simply because the individual died. Under that argument, 
the insurance companies are made better, have to pay less 
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out if their insured happens to kill someone as opposed 
to only injure them. 
And the purposes of the insurance code require 
the interpretation of that code in order to do fairness 
in equity to all the parties and it is not unfair to 
insurance companies to require them to pay the same kind 
of benefits to someone that's been killed plus a funeral 
and survivor benefit as it would be if they had only been 
injured. 
And in the interest of justice, we believe 
that—and under the statutory interpretation, we believe 
that the Estate of Jessie Bott is entitled to all four 
categories of the benefits mandated by the law. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
I haven't read the cases that apparently deal 
with, either directly or collaterally, with the issue 
outside the—reported outside the State. I haven't read 
the case, itself. I've read them in your briefs, but I 
think I'll take a look at a couple of them, see what they 
have to say and see if I think any of them are 
interesting enough to consider their inclusion in this. 
So, I'll take the matter under advisement. 
Gentlemen, I'll probably issue a brief written opinion, 
when I've had a chance to look at those cases and I 
probably won't get to it until next week some time, so 
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1 it'll b e — 
2 MR. SMITH: Can—can we submit 
3 additional cases to the Court? 
4 THE COURT: No, Today's the— 
5 briefings over with, gentlemen. 
6 MR. SMITH: You do need an order 
7 saying that this is the estate and the heirs, that's what 
8 we need to clean up between now and your ruling; is that 
9 the only— 
10 THE COURT: Well, I don't care how 
11 soon you do it, but I do need something to say—I need an 
12 order in the file that says based on the stipulation of 
13 the parties, the defendants in this case are here as 
14 representatives of the estate of the deceased, Jason 
15 Bott; right? 
16 MR. SMITH: Jessie. Okay. 
17 THE COURT: So that—so that I have 
18 an estate here that I can deal with. 
19 MR. SMITH: We'll get that done. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
21 MR. SMITH: Thank you, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: We'll be in recess. 
23 I (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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